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FOREWORD 
This report had its origins in a workshop on "Size and Productive Efficiency - 
The Wider Implications" held under the auspices of the Management and 
Technology Area at IIASA in June 1979. One author, Mark Cantley, was an 
organizer of that workshop; the other, Devendra Sahal, from the International 
Institute of Management, Berlin, was a participant. The workshop brought 
together for the first time economists, technologists, and social scientists to  
discuss the topic on an international basis. One recurrent theme in the dis- 
cussion was the need to see decisions on scale within the dynamics of techno- 
logical and economic development; in particular, questions of learning and the 
concept of the learning curve arose continually, until Professor Bela Gold was 
provoked t o  ask forcefully, "Who learns what?" This report attempts to  answer 
that question. 
Some assumptions about the expected pattern of future improvements in 
efficiency must be built into any planning process relating to  a new plant. 
These assumptions are often built into "learning curves" as though improve- 
ments arise automatically with increasing cumulative production. There is 
confusion as to  whether learning relates to  the one producing unit, to  the 
whole organization, or, indeed, t o  the industry. Delving into the subject, one 
discovers considerable chaos and misunderstanding beneath the beautiful 
simplicity of the learning curve. A great deal of further analysis and exposition 
is needed. 
This report is concerned with a universal, practical problem inherent in 
industrial planning. 
ALEC LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 

SUMMARY 
In terms both of individual units and of groups or organizations, the evolution 
of technological systems has structural similarities to the evolution of bio- 
logical systems. This paper thus makes use of Bonner's description of bio- 
logical development: the law of growth of the constructive processes, the 
internal and external constraints on this growth, the resulting changes of form, 
differentiation, specialization of function, and increased complexity are all 
features common to developments in the biological and technological fields. 
Examples from several industries illustrate technological developments. The 
pursuit of economies of scale exemplifies the parallelism with biological 
development. 
The evolution of technological capability is seen as a learning process in 
which information is acquired, stored, and transmitted. Information can be 
stored in people, stored on paper (or its equivalent), or embodied in physical 
plant. These specifically human capabilities differentiate learning in techno- 
logical fields from biological evolution by natural selection and open up more 
rapid and efficient means of information or technology transfer; in fact, the 
shift is from Darwinian t o  Lamarckian evolution. However, theoretical 
knowledge is important only when translated into practice, and learning 
itself originates in and depends on practice: there are limits t o  the effective 
"storability" of know-how, and similarly to  its transmission. A distinction is 
drawn between "primary" (direct) and "secondary" (derivative, indirectly 
transmitted) learning. 
The terms introduced underlie the phenomenon known as cumulative 
experience, manifest in the "learning curve." Learning, however, is a multilevel 
process, and levels are described as a basis for distinguishing the type of learning 
or information transfer characteristic of each level, answering the question 
"Who learns what?" The intrinsically discrete nature of the learning process - 
a step-function rather than a curve - is illustrated by Waddington's data on 
aircraft-submarine attack performance. An organization's capability is 
described in terms o f  a network of  capabilities. 
The final section discusses policy implications o f  the conceptual framework 
developed in the report. 
CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE GENERAL THEORY 
OF  DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES 2 
3 ILLUSTRATIONS OF  TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 4 
4 LEARNING AND DOING: THE ACQUISITION, STORAGE, 
TRANSMISSION OF CAPABILIn  
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 "Primary" and "Secondary" Learning: People, 
Paper, and Plant 
4.3 Learning and Doing 
4.4 Learning and Levels 
4.5 A Closer Look at the Learning Process 
4.6 Networks of Capability 
AND 
8 
8 
5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 22 
5.1 Specialization and Flexibility 22 
5.2 On "Learning by Doing" and the Pursuit of Understanding - 
A Historical Counter-Example 24 
5.3 Implications for Strategy 2 5 
REFERENCES 2 7 

1 INTRODUCTION 
In this report we offer some concepts as a basis for describing or  modeling the 
evolution of technological systems. Some of the ideas that we develop have 
been presented previously (Sahal 1979a, b, c). Others come from the program 
of research o n  "problems of scale" (Cantley and Glagolev 1978) undertaken at 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
In  the concepts presented here, we identify common ground or relation- 
ships between strands of thought from various disciplines. Fundamental to  our 
thinking are the two dimensions of a technological system: its physical or 
spatial characteristics and its dynamic evolution over time. One objective of our 
work is to  develop generalizations relevant t o  policy issues in technological 
systems. An example is the concept of progress function or learning curve. This 
generalization is not only well documented by empirical studies in many 
industries (Yelle, 1979, gives a comprehensive review) but is also promulgated 
with commercial success by consulting groups using it as the core of a strategy 
formulation framework (see Hedley 1976, 1977). Admittedly, while "learning" 
is much in vogue, the concept is often used with more breadth than precision. 
In the succinct statement of David (1970, p. 562): 
The application of the notion of learning by doing to  account for the 
measured input efficiency growth of an aggregation of production units 
admittedly creates worrisome ambiguities about exactly what is being 
"learned" and by whom. 
Indeed, the crux of the ambiguity in the notion of learning curve may be 
summed up in a single question: "Who learns what?" (Gold 1979). The appli- 
cability of the learning curve and the nature of learning constitute one focus of 
this report. We see it as essential, however, to  set learning within the context of 
the general pattern of growth and change of capabilities that constitutes the 
evolution of a technological system. We hope gradually to  clarify our usage of 
these terms; we deliberately pull together a variety of related or  similar terms 
used for common phenomena. In demonstrating this underlying commonality, 
we seek t o  display the potential convergence, from multiple disciplines, on a 
common conceptual framework. 
2 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE GENERAL THEORY O F  
DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES 
The recognition that the development and application of a technology involves 
a large number of interconnected activities makes i t  easy but unhelpful to  
describe this collection of activities as a "system." It is only when the insights 
derived a t  this level of abstraction lead t o  new practical understanding and t o  
understanding of systems other than those first considered that the abstraction 
justifies itself. 
Von Bertalanffy's pioneering work on general system theory (1 95 1, 1968) 
was rooted largely in his experience of biology, in his perception of underlying 
similarities of structure and behaviour between widely diverse biological 
entities. Of similarly fundamental importance was the work of the biologist 
Thompson (1 9 17), now conveniently edited in Bonner's abridged version. 
Bonner hmself built on  the work of both of these pioneers and on his own 
extensive research to  give in Morphogenesis (1952) a succinct statement of a 
general model of the development process in biological organisms. Although 
Bonner restricted his model t o  the field of biology, we find i t  remarkably 
applicable, a t  least as a starting point, t o  modeling technological systems. As 
Sahal (1979a) has published a description of this general theory of develop- 
mental processes, we shall begin by briefly summarizing i t  here; the authors 
cited have already thoroughly illustrated the theory through biological 
examples, which we may thus omit here. We shall then demonstrate its applic- 
ability t o  technological systems, consider some of the significant respects in 
which technological and biological systems differ, and ultimately derive policy 
implications for managing technological systems. 
Bonner* separates development into two broad categories: 
the "constructive" processes and the "limiting" processes. The former are 
all those which tend to  build up, which are progressive, and the latter 
those which check, guide, and channel the constructive processes. . . . Of 
the constructive processes three seem especially noteworthy: growth, 
morphogenetic movements, and differentiation. Growth will be used here 
in the sense of an increase in matter; i t  involves the intake of energy and 
the storing of some of that energy by synthesis.. . may be reflected in 
changes in size or  weight. . . . Morphogenetic movement. . . gives rise t o  
*Excerpts from John Tyler Bonner, Morphogenesis: An Essay on Development, Princeton University 
Press, copyright O 1952 and 1980. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. 
changes in form. . . . Differentiation is an increase in the differences of 
parts of an organism which occurs between one time during development 
and another time. . . . 
The limiting or checking processes are harder to classify, although in a 
general way we find that there are external limiting factors and internal 
ones. The external ones vary greatly from such matters as mechanical 
stress to food supply limits, matters which often are affected by the size 
of the organism. The internal limits also vary. . . . 
Bonner continues to  elaborate concepts of the development process, and 
although his terminology and case material are exclusively biological, one can 
trace a close parallelism with technological development. He relates his work 
also to  evolution and to phylogeny: 
We tend in our minds to think of individuals of a species as an object in an 
instant of time. . . . But the logicians have often pointed out that [the 
individual] might more correctly refer to some longer segment of tirne. . . . 
Any organism is a living object that alters through the course of time by 
development, and the individual might be defined as the whole of these 
time-space events. Such a procedure would not only please the philos- 
ophers, but also dovetail neatly with de Beer's* notion of evolution. For 
he quite rightly says, phylogeny is not merely a sequence of varied adults, 
but a sequence of varied individuals in the broad sense used here. 
*De Beer, C.R. (1940) Embryos and Ancestors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
In translating the biologists' model of development to  the technological 
context, we are similarly concerned both with the development (ontogenesis) 
of, say, an individual production unit or plant and with the development 
(phylogenesis) of the class of all such individuals as successive ones are 
developed over time. 
Artists, engineers, and designers have long drawn on nature and biology 
for both general patterns and detailed techniques. Our aim is to draw structural 
parallels, and to consider the limits of the parallelism and the key differences, 
between biological and technological systems. As examples of the relevance of 
the basic Bonner model of development as growth, morphogenesis, and dif- 
ferentiation, we can cite two of Gold's points (1 974, 1979). He criticizes the 
confusion between "size" and "scale," pointing out that "size" is increased 
by mere addition and accumulation (i.e., Bonner's "growth") but that an 
increase of scale properly implies redesigning the plant's form (i.e., Bonner's 
"morphogenesis"). On the question of scale, Gold states that "scale economies 
are derived from the increasing specialization of functions" and hence,suggests 
that "scale be defined as the level of planned production capacity which has 
determined the extent to which specialization has been applied in the sub- 
division of the component tasks and facilities of a unified operation." This 
description again tallies with the specialization of function that Bonner 
summarizes by the term "differentiation." 
In the following section, we cite specific technological illustrations of this 
development theory. In Section 4, we turn our attention to  "learning," which 
embraces processes of acquiring, storing, and transmitting capability. Ir! con- 
sidering these functions, we explore some significant differences between tech- 
nological and biological systems. 
3 ILLUSTRATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 
In the evolution of a technological unit or the system of which it forms a part, 
physical size or output capacity is a conveniently measurable and conspicuous 
aspect of growth. The growth itself, however, is motivated not by the desire for 
increased size per se, but by the pursuit and competitive seIection of fitness for 
purpose - measurable in terms of various functional parameters relevant t o  
survival in the wider system. One therefore typically observes, for any chosen 
parameter of functional significance, a monotonic improvement in performance. 
Sahal ( 1  978) has examined the evolution of farm tractor technology from 
its genesis t o  recent years. During the turbulent competitive history of the 
industry in the US, many technological changes were introduced. Each new 
line of development eventually encountered a limiting process; in each case, 
however, the limit eventually could be overcome. As a striking example, 
technological evolution had reached a virtual standstill by the 1940s. Judging 
from the growth of the relevant measures of technology, such as fuel con- 
sumption efficiency, the ratio of horsepower t o  weight, and mechanical 
efficiency, the evolutionary process was at a dead end, with no prospects for 
further progress. A primary cause was an increase in the internal structural 
complexity of technology resulting from continually modifying an essentially 
unchanged form of machine design. New avenues of advance in technology 
were nevertheless found. In particular, the increased adoption of the three- 
point hitch for controlling integrated implements (recently developed after 
prolonged experimental effort) made it possible to  simplify the overall form 
of the machine design and paved the way for considerable improvement in the 
farm tractor's capability. What seemed to be a permanent state of technological 
stagnation thus proved to be a mere interlude to  further innovation. 
Lee (1977) describes a similar process in the context of electric power 
transmission lines: 
History tells us that as we move to higher voltage levels, new technical 
problems may surface. Below 345 kV, lightning used t o  be the controlling 
factor for insulation design. At 500kV, switching surge took over that 
role. At 765 kV, we found a new problem - audible noise - and at 
1100 kV, another - electrostatic induction. We do not know at this time 
what problem will appear at voItages higher than 1500 kV. On the other 
hand, history also shows that as these problems were discovered, solutions 
were found to  preserve the economy of scale. For example, addition of 
a relatively inexpensive resistance and switch in 500 kV circuit breakers 
preserved the economic attractiveness of 500 kV transmission. Whether 
this trend will continue, no one can tell. But unless economics shows that 
higher voltage is more beneficial, I don't believe that anyone will move to 
higher transmission voltages just for the sake of change. 
The limiting processes, as Bonner observes, may be internal or external. 
Many examples of "internal" constraints show that, as size increases, not 
all functional capabilities increase in constant proportion. For example, 
surface areas increase as the square, and volumes as the cube, of the linear 
dimensions. Different functions bear different relationships to  these geometric 
characteristics. 
Over their 100-year technological evolution, fossil-fueled electricity gener- 
ating plants have greatly increased in both physical and economic efficiency. 
During the postwar years, the advantages of larger scale plants were perceived 
and achieved, and the scale of unit ordered in the UK increased from 30 and 
60 MW until 1950 to 200 MW by 1953 and 660MW by 1966 (Abdulkarim and 
Lucas 1977). Similar development in the US and elsewhere achieved units with 
ratings in excess of 1000 MW. In summarizing this development, we should not 
oversimplify the engineering problems involved. In many cases, scaling up the 
physical size meant encountering a barrier on some function or  component 
capability, such as the cooling of bearings, the strength of turbine blades, or  the 
alignment of the shaft. A significant constraint was the weight of the rotor: 
single loads greater than 160 tons could not be handled by the transport system 
from factory to  site. Maximum weight and size limits on transportability con- 
tinue to  determine which units of plant, in any part of the process industries, 
have to be site-fabricated rather than factory-made. The transportability limit, 
being imposed by the environment, clearly is all example of Bonner's external 
constraints on growth. 
On-site fabrication, the solution to  this particular constraint, involves 
significant technical disadvantages. The quality and ease of assembly work 
achievable in a factory are not readily replicated under field conditions. The 
growth of scale of generating unit has been shown by Fisher (1 978) to  be 
clearly and positively related t o  an increase in construction period (see Figure 1). 
Similarly, for chemicals, Woodhouse e t  al. (1974) give the following 
figures for olefin plants (quoted in Cantley, 1979, in a review of scale in 
ethylene plants) : 
Size of plant Construction period 
(tons of ethylenelyear) (months) 
Megawatt rating 
T 
Construction 
period (months) 
60 
50 
40 
FIGURE 1 Scale of fossil-fired generating unit and construction time. 
SOURCE: Fisher 1978. 
- 
- 
- 
- T = 22.5 + 52Rl1000 
(excluding turnkey plants) 
These examples illustrate how the basic pattern of growth, originally pursuing 
efficiency by increasing size, encounters a succession of internal and external 
constraints. These constraints are overcome by changing the form as well as the 
size, i.e., morphogenetic movement. This is typically towards greater com- 
plexity, specialization of function, and differentiation. However, the increased 
complexity, pushing components and constituent materials closer to the limits 
of their capabilities, will inevitably lead to some loss of reliability, as is all too 
clear from the figures quoted by Anson (1977). (See Table 1 .) 
In the chemical industry, disenchantment with large-scale plants has not 
yet been so clearly documented. However, long construction times lead to  
uncertainties in forecasting and planning for these large discrete additions to  
capacity, thus exacerbating the problems of cyclical overcapacity. Friedman 
(1977) also argues the need for chemical engineers to rethink some of their 
designs when scaling up: as he points out, it becomes more appropriate, beyond 
a certain diameter, to  view a pipe as "a large pressure vessel of peculiar 
geometry. This question implies the use of a different design discipline." 
Dealing with the problem of site fabrication and extended construction times, 
Malpas (1 978) has advocated factory-built modular construction of standard- 
ized units. 
TABLE 1 Availability and forced outage rate by 
size groups, fossil-fired plant (figures are 1 0-year 
averages, 1964- 1973). 
Unit size Average Average forced 
(MW) availability (%) outage rate (%) 
60-89 91.7 
90- 1 29 88.3 
130-199 89.0 
200-389 85.9 
390-599 79.6 
600 and larger 72.9 
NOTE: Forced outage hours are the sum of full outage hours and 
equivalent full hours due to partial outage. The rate is expressed as the 
percentage of total hours less economy outage hours (periods when 
capacity is not required, due to load management). 
SOURCE: Edison Electric Institute. Report on Equipment Avail- 
ability for the ten-year periods 1964-1973 and 1965-1974. Copyright 
O 1977, Electric Power Research Institute. 
In his recent paper, Fisher (1979) similarly concludes by arguing for a 
retreat from the maximum scale units and for concentration instead on devel- 
oping and producing a standardized design that would benefit from the dynamic 
economies of scale of the learning curve. 
The key concept of the "learning curve" in technological systems iS that 
the group (company, factory) with greatest accumulated production experience 
can acheve the greatest production efficiency, presumably because it has had 
the largest number of opportunities to refine and improve both the product 
and the production process. Thus the changing scale of successive versions of a 
technological unit should be seen not as a collection of static alternatives but 
as points on a continuum of the development process. The "dynamic scale" 
effect is discussed later in this report, but at this point two caveats should 
be noted. First, the successive improvements associated with cumulatively 
increasing experience will not happen inevitably; the experience creates the 
potential for improvement, but its realization depends on conscious effort. This 
is borne out by the available evidence in a number of areas. For example, it was 
widely believed that the initial availability and capacity factors of newly 
constructed nuclear power plants would be low but that performance measures 
would gradually improve because of accunlulated production experience. 
However, this assumption proved to be largely illusory (Comey 1974). As 
another example, there is concern that the second phase in developing North 
Sea oil fields may prove as costly as the first, for want of requisite learning (see 
Economist, 10 February 1979). To a certain extent, this problem originates in 
the obstacles t o  transmitting learning from one context to  the other, More 
generally, it is apparent that the dynamic scale effects do not always mate- 
rialize. Theoretically, this is t o  be expected: while the learning curve has all 
the appearance of a deterministic model, it is a formulation of what is essen- 
tially a probabilistic phenomenon (Sahal 1979b). 
Second, achieving success involves its own problems, frequently creating a 
complacency that reduces readiness t o  innovate because of the established 
technology's conditioning effect. When major challenges emerge from some 
unexpected direction, the initial response is typically redoubled effort within 
the familiar technology. Utterback (1 978) and Utterback and Abernathy (1 978) 
have documented this phenomenon in a number of industries. This is a good 
example of Kenneth Boulding's proposition, "Nothlng fails llke success." 
4 LEARNING AND DOING: THE ACQUISITION, STORAGE, AND 
TRANSMISSlON OF CAPABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
The biological mechanisms for storing and transmitting capability in the form 
of complex chemical molecules are remarkable structures, exceeding in their 
subtlety the most sophisticated informationstorage artifacts. But these mecha- 
nisms are embedded in individuals and species, subject to  the constraints and 
time lags of natural selection in their ability t o  transmit and enhance the "wis- 
dom" of  the species. The evolution of the capability for memory and language 
enormously amplifies the potential for information storage and transmission, 
and it is in these respects that the human species has most significantly over- 
come the constraints of biology. Moreover, we have learned to disembody 
capability from individual brains and bodies and to transmit and store infor- 
mation independently of them. (One might qualify this by recalling Planck's 
observation that the rate of acceptance of radical new ideas in physics was 
simply related to the mortality of established experts - our learning methods 
have not wholly escaped biological or  sociological constraints.) Gould (1 979) 
neatly expresses this amplification of the capability for transmitting information 
in terms of a shift from the Darwinian to the Lamarckian model of evolution: 
Cultural evolution has progressed at rates that Darwinian processes cannot 
begin to  approach. Darwinian evolution continues in homo sapiens, but 
at  rates so slow that it no longer has much impact on  our history. This 
crux in the Earth's history has been reached because Lamarckian processes 
have finally been unleashed upon it. Human cultural evolution, in strong 
opposition to our biological history, is Lamarckian in character. What we 
learn in one generation, we transmit directly by teaching and writing. 
Acquired characters are inherited in technology and culture. Lamarckian 
evolution is rapid and accumulative. 
We should note, at  least in passing, that our antithesis between biological 
entities, subject to  natural selection, and human artifacts is blurred by the 
achievements of agriculture, today's plants and animals being the results of 
artificial selection and breeding. The distinction is further blurred by genetic 
manipulation, whose acceptance as a technology is well marked by the US 
Supreme Court's June 1980 decision to  allow the patenting of an oil-slick- 
digesting bacterium engineered by General Electric. But the essential dis- 
tinction is that both the old biotechnology of agriculture and the new bio- 
technology of recombinant DNA are intrinsically Lamarckian in the deliberate 
selection and transmission of desired and acquired characteristics. 
In considering learning and the "Lamarckian" transfer or increase of 
acquired capability, we confront a complex phenomenon, in which some 
simple terms and definitions may aid discussion. The following sections intro- 
duce the concepts of "primary" and "secondary" learning and the multiple 
"levels" on which learning can take place. 
4.2  "Primary" and "Secondary" Learning: People, Paper, and Plant 
Learning in the sense of "know-how," of capability to do something, may 
exist in people, be recorded on paper (or other media), be embodied in physical 
plant, or exist in combinations of these three. We shall use the term "primary" 
to  describe learning that depends predominantly or exclusively on direct 
experience accumulated in the human brain, via information transmitted 
through any or all of the physical senses but particularly through the visual 
and tactile senses, the sense of weight, balance, movement, and similar physical 
sensations. Learning to ride a bicycle, to  swim, or to  tighten a nut are three 
instructive examples. It  is almost impossible to convey in words information 
that would significantly accelerate the basic process of learning to ride a 
bicycle. In learning to swim, the role of communicable information is higher: 
the arm and leg movements for effective propulsion can be described in ways 
that will accelerate learning. The provision of "plant," such as cork floats, may 
accelerate the acquisition of the necessary confidence, and performance can be 
further amplified by flippers. Tightening a nut is again analytically fairly 
describable, though in industrialized societies taken largely for granted 
(including the general assumption of right-hand threads). The torque is a matter 
of "feel," which is more difficult to  put in words; where it is critical, it is partly 
coded and partly automated by providing a torque wrench. 
In these simple examples, we have already encountered the three basic 
forms of storing or transmitting capability. We describe as "primary" the 
learning processes of human beings acquiring the "feel" of a task by doing it. 
This sounds llke an "individual" pattern of learning; however, people are not 
only self-teaching entities but can also transmit their understanding to other 
people by example and by language. Given that these activities are also his- 
torically the most traditional and ancient methods of transmission, we include 
them also as "primary" transmission of capability. 
The storage of capability in a form independent of the continued presence 
of its initiator (in writing, diagrams, or computerized information, for example) 
demands a code - and hence encoding ability on the part of the originator and 
decoding ability on the part of subsequent users. Within groups of people of 
common background, education, and culture, much of this code may be 
assumed as common property. The greater the differences in these respects 
between the originators and users, the more explicitly the various codes and 
terms may have t o  be elaborated, and the greater will be the delay or effort 
required t o  recreate in the recipients the capability possessed by the originators. 
In principle, there is no reason why the degree of difficulty and delay should 
not  be quantitatively describable for any given skill, given sufficient empirical 
study. At the receiving end of coded information, the creation of capability 
depends not only on the decoding, but also on the conversion of the infor- 
mation thus conveyed back into primary learning. 
These points may appear obvious, the terminology overelaborate, for the 
familiar acts of learning. They are less obvious, however, when we consider 
such issues as technology transfer between industrialized and primitive societies, 
the design of policies and systems for technical education, or mid-career 
retraining for individuals. Fores and Sorge (1978) virtually go so far as t o  
dispute the feasibility of any effective transfer of technological capability other 
than that based on direct experience, or "primary" learning in our terms: 
. . .a  more fitting model is that of homo faber, the maker of artifacts, 
who arrives a t  his products through a long haul of probing effort which is 
not guided by formal knowledge, but intuitive past experience. . . . Man 
does not primarily learn what is formally imparted t o  him in written or 
oral discourse, but what he is actually made to  practise. It is not results, 
laws or  findings which stick in people's minds and increase their com- 
petence, but the methods they actually put into practice, the objects they 
lay their hands on, and the skills they acquire. Formal knowledge has 
value only insofar as it is closely linked with these processes. 
Having described primary learning and transmission (people) and 
coded transmission (paper), we turn t o  embodied know-how in the form 
of physical plant or tools. The clear trend in manufacturing methods in indus- 
trialized societies has been towards the increased sophistication of equipment 
in terms of the amount of information-handling capability incorporated in 
physical form. Automation displaces not only physical labor by human beings, 
but also the need for mental knowledge; jobs can be de-skilled, as when the 
torque wrench replaces the "feel" of the experienced fitter. This facilitates the 
learning process; determining the extent of the adverse behavioral effects of 
"de-skilling" on the quality of work is beyond the scope of this paper, although 
it  is potentially relevant as a possible "internal" limitation on the  feasible 
development in this direction. Certainly the readiness rapidly to  absorb pre- 
viously alien artifacts and systems has been a characteristic conducive t o  
economic success, as in postwar Japan's not merely learning from American 
technology but going on to  improve on it. Spencer ( 1  970) gives the following 
description: 
As in any other nation, developments in Japan are a complex of many 
factors, but what stands out even on casual examination is its postwar 
technology policy. In simplest terms, this is a discriminating policy of 
borrowing technology or technological systems whenever these appear 
more effective than the old Japanese system. This policy is changing today 
as Japan's leaders become more aware of the need for indigenous research 
and development. But until recently, the Japanese policy was simply to  
borrow the technology intelligently and efficiently. For one illustration, 
the American military presence in Japan during the postwar period pro- 
vided a distinct demonstration effect and opportuility to borrow through 
its management-oriented, research-based technology which had defeated 
Japan. As Japan had done on previous occasions, a large scale take-over of 
the foreign system occurred. Beginning as humble and slavish imitators, 
the Japanese took the latest technology and made it an instrument of 
home production and exports. Gradually they absorbed and made it their 
own by improvements and additions until often the Japanese product was 
the best in the world. Furthermore, though the Japanese demonstrated 
remarkable flexibility in bringing in the new systems, they were able to  
preserve the ongoing Japanese way of life in essential ways which were not 
threatened by the influx of innovation. 
As an illustration of the importance of primary learning, it is interesting to  
note the emphasis placed by Pearson (1978) on the role of person-to-person 
communication in R and D groups: 
Most research shows that although mechanical information systems can be 
of help to  people in R and D, a large part of the information used on a 
day-today basis is passed on by people. 
Secondary learning is derived from primary learning via an intermediate 
recording stage; it is distinguished from it partly by being conducted separately 
in physical terms, but more importantly by emphasizing 
- the development of understanding 
- simplification, coding, and generalization 
- the ability to  store know-how and thus to  retain learning 
These are, however, means rather than ends. The objective of understanding, 
coding, and generalizing is to  aid the primary learning process both by 
condensing it and by amplifying the range of capability acquired. The 
amplification has two dimensions. First, the lessons learned through practice 
are shown, through experimentation and investigation directed towards 
increasing understanding, to  have wider applicability than the original context 
in which they were developed. Second, the encoding and systematizing of the 
developed understanding is designed to  facilitate its teaching, transmission, and 
storage. If effective, this enables the lessons originally learned in one location 
to  be rapid.1~ and widely disseminated, thus amplifying the application of the 
primary learning. 
Thus secondary learning has a vital role to  play in the acceleration, storage, 
and diffusion of technological learning, but it starts from and returns t o  the 
processes of primary learning. As Mao Tse-tung (1937) precisely expressed it, 
If you want to acquire knowledge you must take part in the practice of 
changing reality. 
If we have a correct theory, but merely talk about it, lay it aside, and fail 
to  put it into practice, then that theory, however good, has no importance. 
Knowledge begins with practice, reaches the theoretical level through 
practice, and then returns to  practice. 
4.3 Learning and Doing 
In discussing the growth of physical scale as one method of enhancing per- 
formance capability, we were led t o  recognize also the dynamic aspect of 
capability: cumulative experience may be as important a factor as large-scale 
plant. By relating capability to  cumulative experience, rather than t o  embodied 
know-how in the form of capital equipment, we recognize the role of "learning 
by doing." A familiar form of this is the "learning curve" or  "experience curve" 
discussed below. 
The central concept of the experience curve is akin t o  the previously 
quoted statement of Mao Tse-tung about knowledge and practice. Viewing 
capability and practice as inseparable has many implications for technological 
and industrial strategy. For example, a long-standing argument (used, for 
example, in the US by List and Carey in the mid-nineteenth-century debate 
on free trade versus protectionism (see Calleo and Rowland 1973)) is that a 
nation's industrial capability must be preserved in order to  avoid unacceptable 
dependence on foreign supply. List in fact argues that the capability to  act is 
as important as are the fruits of acting - that productive power is "infinitely 
more important than wealth itself." Many countries, for example, might wish 
t o  take advantage of cheap imports - whether of oil, coal, food, or manu- 
factured products - when available but at the same time insure themselves 
against future potential supply disruption by maintaining a domestic coal 
industry, agriculture, and manufacturing capability. Similarly, at company 
level, strategic flexibility would indicate as desirable the maintenance of 
capability in a broader spread of skills or technologies than are fully required 
by the current activities. But the logic of the learning curve is that, at least 
relatively, the highest capability is sustainable only by those actively engaged. 
Capabilities put into cold storage freeze to  death. 
The dependence of capability on experience can be one of the strategic 
factors in those industries in which the growth of unit scale in the process 
plant, particularly in markets whose total growth rate is modest, dramatically 
reduces the number of available "learning opportunities," i.e., orders. Ball and 
Pearson's description (1977) of sinter plants in the UK is instructive - four 
orders in a decade, divided between three contractors. As they point out, 
To be able to  tender for the largest complex plant the contractor requires 
experience to draw upon, and that experience cannot be acquired if the 
contractor fails t o  obtain orders. . . . This learning effect will give the 
f i s t  contractor to build the large plants a competitive advantage, since for 
subsequent orders his design costs are below those of his competitors. 
4.4 Learning and Levels 
Some of the confusion surrounding the discussion of learning curve - the 
"Who learns what?" question - may be removed by a more explicit con- 
sideration not only of the nature of the learning process, but also of the dif- 
ferent levels on which it can occur. Following Cantley and Glagolev's (1978) 
discussion of the levels on which "problems of scale" may be considered, we 
distinguish 
1.  the unit level: a single piece of equipment, single-train process plant, 
or product line 
2. the plant level: a single plant or factory, wbich may contain several 
level 1 entities 
3. the organization or company level: typically the multi-plant firm 
4. the industry level: all the firms within the industry (possibly within 
one country or  market) 
5. the society level: the wider society, within which the manufacturing 
and marketing of the goods takes place 
Figure 2 summarizes these levels, with a typical member of each level 
lying within the next higher level - as, for example, one blast furnace within 
one steelworks of a steel company that is one of several in that industry, the 
industry being one sector of the larger economy and society. While reality 
would complicate the picture, with diversified firms and multinational 
industries, the figure serves as a framework for arrows representing information 
transfer or  "learning." These are of three kinds: 
1. The circular arrows represent learning occurring cumulatively over 
time within a particular entity on its own level. 
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FIGURE 2 Levels and directions of learning or information transfer. 
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2. The vertical arrows represent transfer of information o r  know-how 
between levels. 
3.  The horizontal arrows represent transfer between an entity and other 
entities on the same level (whether o r  not within the same higher 
level). 
In spite of the diagram's oversimplification, the 43 arrows of Figure 2 
represent the many different interpretations and answers that might be offered 
in response t o  the question "Who learns what?" Although the following 
examples of types of learning d o  not form an exhaustive list, they are repre- 
sented on the diagram and are a t  least indicative. (The parallel arrows in 
opposite directions are different but symmetrical, in the sense that exporting 
differs from importing, although every export is someone else's import; 
learning is not identical t o  teaching.) 
A t  level I ,  the circular arrow represents the learning typically documented 
in empirical studies of the learning curve: a single group or team, working on 
the  same product (more or less) and improving with practice, innovations 
(particularly process innovations), or both;  these could include increases of 
scale. 
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The vertical arrow between levels 1 and 2 represents the acquisition, 
resulting from level 1 activity, of experience relevant t o  the supervisory, 
managerial, and technical support functions and t o  other services at factory 
level. Such staff could be transferred to  other factories in the company, leave 
the company, take their know-how to  other industries, or emigrate; all these 
possibilities are included in the horizontal arrow(s) at level 2. 
At organizational level, the history of the large US corporation's growth 
has been explained in terms of the evolutionary advantage conferred by faster 
or better information transfer within a unified administration than could be 
achieved between independent entities (see Chandler 1962, and Temin's 1978 
review of Chandler 1977). This implies learning at level 3, subsequently propa- 
gated t o  levels 4 and 5. 
Similarly, all the arrows in the diagram have their interpretation. At the 
societal level, one could consider the formal educational system and curricula, 
capabilities and qualifications of the labor force, social and cultural attitudes 
t o  work, government policies affecting industry - in short, all environmental 
factors that may facilitate or inhibit acquiring, maintaining, and transferring 
capabilities on  each level. 
After drafting Figure 2, we discovered a remarkably similar figure in the 
very different context of The Active Society, a major work by the American 
sociologist, Amitai Etzioni (1 968). He describes the "Dimensions of a Macro- 
Sociology of Knowledge" as follows: 
Societal units produce knowledge and use it collectively. Knowledge does 
not exist only in the minds of individuals; like other societal assets, 
knowledge is stored in collective facilities (from libraries to  computer 
tapes), is made available for collective action (as when an organization 
retains experts), and is shifted from the service of one societal goal t o  the 
service of another, e.g., by transferring a large contingent of laboratory 
employees from the service of the United States Army to  that of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Agency. Though knowledge is an unusual 
asset in that it is a set of symbols rather than objects, we suggest that it is 
nevertheless fruitful t o  view it as an asset and t o  study the production, 
processing, and consumption of knowledge as societal activities. 
The societal environment's relevance t o  learning is most readily perceived 
when one considers a company diversifying into an industry unfamiliar to  it, 
innovators pioneering a totally new field, or a company trying t o  start opera- 
tions in an industrially underdeveloped country. Delaying or inhibiting factors 
in the last case might include the following: 
- linguistic and cultural differences 
- the absence or cost of creation of physical and administrative infra- 
structure 
- differences in natural environment: climate, terrain, resource endow- 
ments 
- existing investment in incompatible equipment 
Planning feasible trajectories for development requires consideration of 
sequencing that takes these links and dependencies into account - a point well 
discussed by Vietorisz (1974), who includes the following questions in his 
concluding list of primary criteria for technological choices in project evalu- 
ation in developing countries: 
What does the project (technical alternative) contribute to  institution 
building? Does it stimulate new skills, new capabilities, new organ- 
ization? 
Does it lead toward technological autonomy or a perpetuation of 
dependency, especially on mother companies in foreign countries? 
Does it contribute toward technological integration? Does it help t o  
tie together universities and research institutes with producing 
enterprises? 
Moyes (1979) has usefully illustrated questions of technology transfer from 
Oxfam case material. He points out that most so-called appropriate/alternative 
technology organizations start with the technologies of the rich and seek t o  
adapt them for the poor and argues that it might be preferable to  help people 
acquire the skill to  improve their own technology or to  adapt for themselves 
the imported technology; local knowledge of local conditions is usually best. 
This is the transition problem between secondary and primary learning. 
Appropriate technology (which may be simple, intermediate or  high) can 
be developed by outsiders (i.e., people who are not going t o  use it), but it 
can only be transformed by insiders - by the people who are going to 
use it and benefit from it. Failure to  appreciate this is a major reason why 
the very poor do not use more technology. 
4.5 A Closer Look at the Learning Process 
Returning to what is happening in the learning processes summarized by the 
"curve" of improving performance, gains are made, as Moyes points out, 
predominantly in terms of primary learning and plant modifications. The 
deliberate coding of the know-how is not generally made in great detail, 
perhaps no more than is required for specification of operations on a standard 
cost card. As volume expands and labor is recruited, or as additional manu- 
facturing centers are to  be started for the same product, it becomes necessary 
t o  institute more systematic training programs and therefore to make the best 
practice more explicit. At the same time, disciplines such as work measurement, 
method study, value engineering, and production engineering are brought to  
bear o n  both the product and the process t o  achieve further gains in efficiency. 
As experience accumulates, the capability has developed in the following 
ways: 
the primary skills of the experienced direct labor 
the physical equipment, now fully de-bugged, adapted, run-in, tried, 
and tested 
the experience of supervisory, ancillary, managerial, and admini- 
strative aspects (e.g., maintenance requirements, appropriate working 
conditions, recording procedures, standard costs) - embodied in 
both people and written procedures 
training programs for additional labor (experienced people, written 
procedures, and appropriate materials) 
blueprints for the physical equipment 
These aspects of capability are not confined to  the direct work force but may 
include suppliers of materials, components, and services, who will necessarily 
have been exposed t o  the learning process; this is a theme t o  which we return in 
Section 4.6. 
The learning curve has been propagated almost as though it represented an 
inexorable law that whenever cumulative output doubles, unit costs decline 
by x%, x being a constant, characteristic of the product. More prudently, 
some industrialists stress that it represents the potential improvement in 
performance, under conditions of sufficient pressure. There is, however, 
something intrinsically implausible about continuing improvement in a wholly 
repetitious task: one can shear only a finite number of sheep in a lifetime, and 
presumably one's speed reaches a maximum after the first few hundred.* 
In manufacturing processes, however, few tasks of significant complexity 
are as wholly repetitious as they may at first appear, even on the most mass- 
produced and apparently standardized product. For  example, when the owner 
of a mass-produced car wants a spare part, he will often have to  quote the year 
o r  even the engine or chassis number, indicating that there have been some 
changes during the production of the same standard model. Even within the 
same product and part there will have been many possibilities for minor changes 
in the manufacturing process - supplier changes, value engineering of the 
design, method study, and work measurement applied to  the assembly process, 
right down t o  individuals acquiring practice through the processes of primary 
learning. 
Figure 3(b), rather than the conventional Figure 3(a), represents what 
the "true" learning curve would look like if anyone bothered t o  make the 
necessary detailed observations. Few research studies do, or can, go into the 
microscopic detail envisaged in Figure 3(b). However, in further research, it 
may be important t o  appreciate the stepwise nature of the learning. For 
*But see Hudson (1980) for progress on the development of robot sheep-shearers! 
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FIGURE 3 Conventional and discrete representations of learning curves. 
instance, the earlier period in Figure 3(b) would be characterized by higher 
frequency of innovation and a larger step size; later periods, by lower 
frequency and smaller improvements. The frequency might be susceptible to 
management pressure, the inherent potential for improvement less so, except 
insofar as prior relevant experience can be transferred, enabling production to  
start "well down the curve" - as though x thousand of the new product had 
already been made. 
As a rich example of a "learning" process in a "complex" task, consider 
Figure 4, in which Waddington (1973) summarizes the progressively increasing 
effectiveness with which German submarines were destroyed by British Coastal 
Command aircraft during World War 11. The example is perhaps too rich, in 
that the submarines could also learn - they did in fact experiment (with 
remaining surfaced and fighting back, for example), and there was a techno- 
logical battle of radio detection and listening devices. However, the U-boats 
were constrained by the requirements of their operational targets, their base 
location, and the technology of their diesel-generators and batteries (obliging 
them to surface for a certain number of hours). Thus within the time period 
covered, operational and tactical initiative lay largely with the attackers. 
Given the serious and growing loss of British shipping due to  the sub- 
marines, the pressure to  learn was maximized. As Waddington describes the 
situation, organizational constraints on learning were minimized; innovative 
behavior was prized, and communication between pilots, senior officers, and 
operational research scientists was extensive and uninhibited. In his final 
summary, Waddington identifies this aspect as one of the two most important 
lessons (the other being adequate staff) of the wartime experience: 
. . .the entire development of the complex and interrelated body of 
scientific doctrine was guided at every step, not solely by the scientists 
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who did the actual thinking and calculating, but to  at least as large an 
extent by the senior Staff Officers whose needs the scientists were trying 
t o  serve. The relation between the scientists and Staff was one of almost 
unblemished cooperation and trust. If this had failed on either side, 
Operational Research as Coastal Command knew it would have been 
impossible. If the scientists had not been taken completely into the 
Commander-inchief's confidence, if they had not sat in at his most 
professional and confidential conferences but had been fobbed off a t  
lower level discussions, they would have learnt only too late of the 
importance of many of the subjects to which they made contributions of 
some value. Or again if the scientists had not spontaneously offered their 
views, as equals and not as mere servants of the Staff, many of their 
contributions would have been missed, since it is only the nian trained in 
scientific thought who can see t o  which problems it can be applied. The 
credit for incorporating the scientists thus fully into the Command team 
belongs in rather small measure to  the O.R.S. itself; beyond exercising a 
reasonable tact, there was little they could do about it. I t  was the readiness 
of the professional Air Force officer, given the lead by the Commanders- 
inchief,  to  acknowledge the value of the scientists' professional training, 
which alone made possible the whole success of Operational Research.* 
If we replace the stepwise pattern of Figure 4 by a continuous curve, it 
might provide a simpler mathematical model, but it is clear that we would not 
only be losing "random noise" but might also be losing specific understanding 
of the nature of the process. 
Our discussion thus far has been primarily in terms of manufacturing 
capability. Most of the well-documented studies in the literature have reported 
and quantified learning effects at this level. However, we have deliberately 
introduced Waddington's example of increasing effectiveness, not only because 
it illustrates in detail the stepwise nature of the process, but because the 
learning process there included a broad range of actors, from the pilots and 
crews in the aircraft, to the base commanding officers and headquarters strate- 
gists, and the scientists of the operational research section. It thus spans several 
of the levels of Figure 2, and the experience went further still. 
The postwar diffusion of operational research in the UK reflects the 
conclusion, by those closely involved with it in the military context, that they 
had acquired or stumbled on an approach and an outlook of wider applicability. 
Thus it is evidence of a learning process abstracted from the primary activity, 
upwards to levels 4 and 5, and horizontally between entities on these levels. 
Throughout industry and government - indeed, enshrined in the customs of 
many societies both industrial and primitive - there is a widespread belief that 
on  these levels, age and experience are the appropriate routes to  the accumu- 
lation of wisdom. The general validity of this assumption has not often been 
put to  specific or empirical test; on a priori grounds, one might expect its 
*From Waddington 1973. Reprinted by permission of the estate of the late C. H. Waddington. 
validity to  be dependent on the constancy of environmental conditions. But it 
demonstrates a belief in the acquisition through practice of general skills, 
having application beyond the specific contexts within which they were first 
acquired. This again represents transfer on the upward vertical arrows of 
Figure 2. 
That this belief may be inappropriate for volatile environments is also 
well documented, particularly where a rigid and formal organization becomes 
insensitive to  the need continually to  be receptive to  changes in conditions. The 
belief of military chiefs in Britain, France, and Poland, as late as the 1930% in 
the superiority of cavalry over tanks, in spite of available evidence to  the 
contrary, is a grim example (Liddell Hart 1970). 
The recognition of acquired capability in the Waddington case is most 
eloquently testified to  by the Ministry of Defence's refusal to  give clearance to 
his book, written in 1946, until 1973. 
4.6 Networks o f  Capability 
We now consider more carefully some characteristics of the nature of capa- 
bility, and in what it resides. I ts development is stimulated by need or by 
incentive. It is maintained and increased by exercise and can atrophy if not 
used. Capability in manufacturing almost any moderately complex product 
comprises a network of more specific capabilities, the finest elements of the 
network comprising individual people of specific skills, individual units of 
plant or  their components, and stored information. Many - indeed, most - of 
these elements will not be found within one organization; the network includes 
suppliers and suppliers' suppliers. 
The specific capabilities could be listed; what gives them "network" form 
is their assembly in a specific configuration for a specific purpose - particularly, 
the purpose of manufacturing a certain class of products. 
The network links could represent the flows between capability centers of 
various materials characteristic of this manufacturing activity or  the flows of 
information associated with this manufacturing. Where the information flows, 
so does the potential for learning. 
Let us suppose that we have a certain complex product whose manu- 
facture requires the manufacture and assembly of several components and sub- 
systems. 
Each of these components o r  subsystems is typically associated with one 
o r  more functions and provides a specifiable level of performance of that 
function. It  will also have physical, economic, and other attributes. 
If the whole product is changed - t o  produce higher performance or  
other changed attributes, for example - the change must be achieved by 
changing one or  more of the components or subsystems. If we consider a wide 
range of possible types of change, we are likely to  discover that changes in one 
component o r  subsystem require changes in another, rippling throughout a 
larger area of the network -- though it will be inconvenient if minor changes 
create major disturbances. Indeed, it would be an object of modular design t o  
avoid this. 
In considering technological capability, particularly for complex 
manufactures, it is important to  recognize this inherently network-like 
characteristic. Some of its significant implications include the following: 
- The technological capabilities of the firms in a country will be 
positively correlated by their common sources of bought+ut services 
and materials, however much the managerial and design capabilities 
of the firms differ. 
- It  will be difficult to  establish a complex high-technology manu- 
facturing establishment in an environment lacking the supporting 
services and supplies available in the original location. 
- Technological development will require a trajectory in which the 
supporting infrastructure has the necessary coherence; insofar as the 
latter is lacking, the centers of development will have an isolated 
character, lacking linkage or integration in the host society, dependent 
on imported sources (of supplies or skills), and both vulnerable t o  
disruption (if sources are remote) and disruptive to  the host society 
(through its imposition of demands that are unfamiliar, infeasible, 
or  both) (Vietorisz 1974). 
The relationship of the network character of capabilities t o  the previously 
discussed concepts of learning and multilevel information transfer will be 
evident from the discussion that follows. 
5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
5.1 Specialization and Flexibility 
Primary learning at  level 1 has close similarities to  the biological model of 
functional specialization for increased efficiency in the individuals of a species. 
Survival and prosperity also depend on  the joint behavior of the species in its 
living activities, and the evolution of patterns of societal behavior corresponds 
t o  the "learning" behavior of technical or  social systems from level 2 upwards, 
in the terms of Figure 2. 
However, learning at  all levels can diminish capability in two other 
potentially significant respects. First, as physical plant becomes progressively 
more specialized, it is by definition becoming less capable of being used for any 
other type of production. 
Second, by processes of habituation, the human responses at all levels, 
from direct labor t o  supervisory and managerial, are likely similarly t o  become 
strongly attached t o  the products, processes, and systems in which they have 
invested time and effort. These achievements are the demonstrable output of 
their efforts and the justification for their status; they may therefore naturally 
become increasingly reluctant to abandon them and resistant to  radical 
innovation. 
The capability to  respond to environmental change includes both taking 
advantage of change, by appropriate adaptation or  development to suit 
the new situation, and minimizing the damage caused by change. Authors in a 
variety of disciplines have used many words for the latter ability - resilience, 
robustness, defensive flexibility. In the context of high-technology systems of 
which high performance and reliability are demanded, a useful term and 
concept is that of the reversionary modes of operation of the system. For 
example, in navigation systems for air transport, several methods of establishing 
position are typically provided. If the normal or preferred mode breaks down, 
this redundancy enables the crew immediately to switch to  an alternative. Even 
if two o r  more failures occur, the crew can still revert to other procedures and 
are trained to do so. Similarly, pilots are trained to cope with many emergency 
conditions, such as the failure of one or more of the engines on a multiengine 
plane. 
In manufacturing organization, flexibility in the face of shocks can be 
consciously developed in many ways, such as second sources for all key supplies 
(i.e., redundancy in the capability network - sound ecology) and stockpiles of 
essential components and supplies. The development of flexibility in manu- 
facturing capability tends to  be antithetical t o  the processes of specialization 
involved in learning. The capability is likely to  reside at a level above the 
specialist operations of the product line. 
The need to develop flexibility, reversionary modes of operation, and the 
like is determined mainly by the characteristics of the external environment. 
One can contrast two species and two sets of environmental characteristics, as 
shown in Table 2. For simplicity, we suppose some single measure of per- 
formance related t o  survival, such as food-gathering efficiency. 
For example, Group A could be illustrated by African populations con- 
taining the gene which (if present in both parents) leads to  sickle-cell anemia in 
the offspring; this disadvantage has not led to the gene's elimination by natural 
selection because the gene offers greater resistance t o  malaria. Where malaria 
has been eradicated, the incidence of the gene is predictably declining (e.g., 
among the population of African origin in the US), this element of "flexibility" 
no longer having any advantages to offset its "cost." 
At the level of the organization, a discussion of how to describe, and what 
constitutes, strategic flexibility leads naturally into the literature of strategic 
planning and management. 
An analysis of the elements of strategic capability will clearly tend to be 
dominated by physical plant capabilities and locations and by financial 
resources, but both the plant and the existing skills of personnel represent the 
physical and human forms of know-how. In the broadest sense, then, the 
processes of learning are seen as central to the processes of survival and strategy. 
TABLE 2 Illustration of the relationship between performance capability 
and the characteristics of the environment. 
Performance 
Environment characteristics 
Prone to 
characteristics Stable sudden change 
Group A 
High variance (therefore more Can survive Higher prospect of 
individuals away from the but inferior to B in adaptability and 
optimum) total performance survival 
Group B 
Low variance, around ldeal Risk of 
optimum catastrophic 
collapse 
The strategic significance of a weak information strategy is illustrated by 
example in the following section. 
5.2 On "Learning by Doing9'and the Pursuit o f  Understanding - 
A Historical Counter-Exarrrple 
All learning originates in practice, through the forms we have termed primary 
learning and transmission. If viewed as the only form of effective learning, this 
can become a blind alley. Barnett (1978) has documented the profoundly 
debilitating consequences of Britain's neglect of formal technical education 
during the nineteenth century. The neglect was repeatedly recognized by 
successive commissions of enquiry, such as the Schools Enquiry (Royal) 
Commission in 1868 : 
We are bound to point out that our evidence appears to show that our 
industrial classes have not even the basis of sound general education on 
which alone technical education can rest. 
These warnings did not lead to effective action because they ran counter 
t o  the prevailing philosophy of liberal individualism and self-help. The "learning 
by doing" philosophy was expounded by the Economist (1850): 
. . .the education whch fits men to  perform their duties in life is not t o  be 
got in school, but in the counting-house and lawyer's office, in the shop or 
the factory. (Quoted by Barnett.) 
Other countries' more deliberate development of formal technical 
education - for example, the Swiss and German polytechnics - provided a 
much sounder basis for continued development of industrial or technological 
capability. It linked the primary learning in the factories with the facilities and 
social prestige of institutions responsible for technical education and with the 
processes of secondary learning. As another Royal Commission commented in 
1884 about the German polytechnic system, 
To the multiplication of these polytechnics may be ascribed the general 
diffusion of a high scientific knowledge in Germany, its appreciation by 
all classes of persons, and the adequate supply of men competent, so far 
as theory is concerned, to  take the place of managers and superintendents 
of industrial works. In England there is still a great want of this last class 
of person. 
The history of British technical education, by contrast, shows it  much 
slower to develop (see Musgrave 1964). Under pressure both from employers 
concerned with the secrecy of their processes and from trade unions concerned 
with the protection of their crafts, practical instruction was to  be excluded 
from technical education. After seven attempts, the Technical Instruction Act 
reached the statute book in 1889. It was concerned with 
. . .instruction in the principles of science and art applicable to industries, 
and in the application of specific branches of science and art to  specific 
industries or employments. It shall not include teaching the practice of 
any trade or industry or employment. . . . 
Fortunately, as the Bryce Commission reported in 1895, the Department of 
Education was "liberal rather than strict in its interpretation." 
5.3 Implications for Strategy 
One of the recurrent themes in the history of industrial strategy is the failure 
to recognize, or indeed t o  be alert to, qualitative change and the broader 
context. As part of the process of sharpening perception of technological 
change, we suggest that there is value for the users or developers of any tech- 
nology in seeking to identify its "law of growth," its limitations, and the likely 
future or  ultimate need for morphogenesis and differentiation. This is the basis 
and objective of technological forecasting. 
Other points following from our analysis include (1) the desirability of 
incorporating a technological dimension in strategic decision making and 
(2) the need for a quantitative and structured perception of one's local com- 
petitive and strategic position. 
The policy applications of improved understanding of the processes of 
technological innovation, improvement, and learning exist at each level, as 
follows. (Items 1 and 2 are in fact better viewed as a continuum than as in- 
trinsically different.) 
1. Improving the operational efficiency of producing an existing product. 
2. Planning and controlling development effort on introducing "new" 
processes and products. 
3. Making strategic choices of direction in developing an organization's 
activities. This encompasses maintaining present positions, abandoning 
some old ones, and entering new ones. When we speak of "positions" 
or "activities," we mean not only "product range" and "market 
sector," but the whole spectrum of functional abilities that collectively 
constitute the capability t o  operate in the chosen sector. Item 3 may 
be interpreted, mutatis mutandis, at many organizational levels: 
- the operating group within a factory 
- the whole factory 
- the multi-plant company 
- the multi-company conglomerate 
- the industry 
- the country 
- the supranational grouping 
- worldsociety 
Clearly, however, the structures for organizing efforts and coordinating them 
vary enormously between these eight groupings. 
Conflicts between these functions will probably arise, the strategic desir- 
ability of abandoning a sector conflicting with the tendency of those operating 
within it t o  seek resources for improving their performance. 
At societal and indeed at global level, we may expect a changing balance 
between the strategic significance of capability and of natural resources. The 
balance is currently shifting from the former towards the latter; as time goes 
on, capability becomes more widespread and commonplace on a broader range 
of skills, while natural resources diminish and become of increasing value and 
scarcity. Such global long-term studies as the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) "Interfutures" (1979) suggest that the 
developed industrial countries can maintain their position, employment, and 
living standards only by continuously maintaining a lead in high-skill, high- 
technology new products. On the other hand, insofar as these are characteristic 
potential outputs of any society that has moved itself far enough down the 
cumulative experience curve of education and development, one may observe 
a feature of such curves. Two competitors initially separated by one's having a 
finite advantage in years of experience or cumulative output will see this 
initially wide performance difference diminish to  insignificance. If the leader 
stagnates in technological complacency, he will be overtaken. 
A more stable and sustainable long-term pattern will be acheved by 
developing the capability t o  create the sophisticated products and services of a 
rich life-style from widely available common and renewable resources. The 
long-term future will depend on such capabilities as genetic manipulation and 
biotechnology rather than on indefinitely continuing discoveries of convenient 
resources. The latter are inexorably diminished by exploitation, whereas 
information, capability, and education are amplified by their propagation and 
use. The long-term balance of advantage thus returns to capability. 
REFERENCES 
Abdulkarim, A. J., and N. J. D. Lucas (1977) Economies of scale in electricity generation 
in the United Kingdom. Energy Research 1 : 223-23 1. 
Anonymous (1979) North Sea oil: learning curves. Economist, 10 February, 270(7067):110. 
Anson, D. (1977) Availability of Fossil-Fired Steam Power Plants. Electric Power Research 
Institute Special Report. FP-422SR. 
Ball, D. F., and A. W. Pearson (1977) Influence of increasing size of metallurgical plant on 
process-contractor economics. In Advances in Extractive Metallurgy. London: Insti- 
tution of Mining and Metallurgy. 
Barnett, C. (1978) The Human Factor and British Industrial Decline: An Historical Per- 
spective. London: Working Together Campaign. 
Bertalanffy, L. von (1951) Problems of general system theory. Human Biology 23:302-312. 
Bertalanffy, L. von (1968) General System Theory. New York: George Braziller. 
Bonner, J. T. (1952) Morphogenesis: An Essay on Development. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Calleo, D. P., and B. M. Rowland (1973) America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic 
Dreams and National Realities. Bloornington and London: Indiana University Press. 
Cantley, M. F. (1979) The Scale of Ethylene Plants: Background and Issues. WP-79-43. 
Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
Cantley, M. F., and V. N. Glagolev (1978) "Problems of Scale" - The Case for IIASA 
Research. RM-78-47. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis. 
Chandler, A. D. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American 
Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press. 
Chandler, A. D. (1977) The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Hanard University Press, Belknap Press. 
Comey, D. D. (1974) Will idle capacity kill nuclear power? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
November :23-28. 
David, P. A. (1970) Learning by doing and tariff protection: a reconsideration of 
ante-bellum United States cotton textile industry. Journal of Economic History 
30:521-601. 
Etzioni, A. (1968) The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes. London: 
Collier-Macmillan and New York: the Free Press. 
Fisher, J. C. (1978) Size-dependent Performance of Subcritical Fossil Generating Units. 
Palo Alto, California: Electric Power Research Institute. 
Fisher, J. C. (1979) Optimum size of subcritical fossil-fueled electric generating units. Paper 
presented at IIASA workshop, Size and Productive Efficiency - The Wider Impli- 
cations, 26-29 June. In Buzacott, J.  A., Cantley, M. F., Glagolev, V. N., and Tomlinson, 
R. C., eds., Scale in Production Systems. Oxford: Pergamon Press. To be published. 
Fores, M., and A. Sorge (1978) The Rational Fallacy. Discussion paper. Dp/78-84. Berlin: 
International Institute of Management. 
Friedman, G. (1977) Large petrochemical plants are using tomorrow's concepts. Oil and Gas 
Journal, 12 December:8@84. 
Gold, B. (1 974) Evaluating scale economies: the case of Japanese blast furnaces. Journal of 
lndustrial Economics, September: 1 - 18. 
Gold, B. (1979) Scale, technological change and economic effects: some empirical bases for 
revising prevailing concepts. Paper presented at IIASA workshop, Size and Productive 
Efficiency - The Wider Implications, 26-29 June. In Buzacott, J. A., Cantley, M. F., 
Glagolev, V. N., and Tomlinson, R. C., eds., Scale in Production Systems. Oxford: 
Per'gamon Press. To be published. 
Gould, S. J. (1979) Another look at  Lamarck. New Scientist 84(1175):38-40. 
Hedley, B. (1976) A fundamental approach to strategy development. Long Range Planning 
9(6):2-11. 
Hedley, B. (1 977) Strategy and the "business portfolio." Long Range Planning 10(1):9- 15. 
Hudson, Paul (1980) Technology brings home the wool harvest. New Scientist 87 (1218): 
768-771. 
Lee, T. H. (1977) The case for evolutionary optimization. In Future Strategies for Energy 
Development: A Question of Scale. Proceedings of Oak Ridge Universities Conference, 
Tennessee, October 1976. 
Liddell Hart, B. H. (1970) History of the Second World War. London: Cassell. 
Malpas, R. (1978) As reported in "Plant-after-next" will use much less energy. Financial 
Times, European Energy Report, 20 June. 
Mao Tse-tung (1 937) On Practice. ~ e k i n ~ :  Foreign Languages Press. 
Moyes, A. (1979) The Poor Man's Wisdom: Technology and the Very Poor. Oxford: Oxfam. 
Musgrave, P. W. (1964) The definition of technical education, 186@1910. Vocational 
Aspects of Secondary and Further Education 16(34) : 105- 1 1 1. Reprinted in 
Musgrave, P. W., ed. (1970) Sociology, History and Education. London: Methuen. 
Pearson, A. W. (1978) Review of selected information transfer studies. Paper presented at 
the NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) 
Technical Information Panel's Specialists' Meeting, Paris, 18-19 October. To be 
published. 
Sahal, D. (1978) Evolution of Technology: A Case Study of the Farm Tractor. Discussion 
paper. Dp 78-99. Berlin: International Institute of Management. 
Sahal, D. (1979a) A theory of evolution of technology. International Journal of Systems 
Science 10(3):259-274. 
Sahal, D. (1979b) A theory of progress functions. Transactions of American Institute of 
Industrial Engineers 1 1 : 23-29. 
Sahal, D. ( 1 9 7 9 ~ )  Recent Advances in a Theory of Technological Change. Discussion Paper. 
Dp 79-1 1. Berlin: International Institute of Management. 
Spencer, D. L. (1970) Technology Gap in Perspective. New York: Spartan Books. 
Ternin, P. (1 978) Chandler's The Visible Hand Bell Journal of Economics 9(1) :297-303. 
Thompson, D'A. W. (1917) On Growth and Form. Abridged edition (1969) by J. T. Bonner. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Utterback, J. M. (1978) Business Invasion by Innovation. MIT report. CPA/wp-78-13. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Policy 
Alternatives. 
Utterback, J. M., and W. J. Abernathy (1978) Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology 
Review 80(7):2-9. 
Vietorisz, T. (1974) Diversification, linkage and integration focus in the technology policies 
of developing countries. Pages 57-77, Transfer of Technology for Small Industries. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Waddington, C. H. (1973) 0 .  R. in World War 11: Operational Research Against the U-Boat. 
London: Elek Science. 
Woodhouse, G . ,  D. Samols, and J.  Newman (1974) The economics and technology of large 
ethylene projects. Chemical Engineering, 18 March: 72-85. 
Yelle, L. E. (1979) The learning curve: historical review and comprehensive survey. Decision 
Sciences lO(2) :302-328. 

THE AUTHORS 
Mark F. Cantley was a research scientist at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria from January 1978 to  October 
1979. He is now with the "FAST" team (Forecasting and Assessment in the 
field of Science and Technology) in Directorate-General XI1 (Research, Science 
and Education) of the Commission of the European Communities, Rue de la 
h i  200, Brussels, Belgium. 
Devendra Sahal is a research fellow at the International Institute of Manage- 
ment, Platz der Luftbrucke 1-3, D-1000 Berlin (West) 42. 
